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INTERVIEW WITH KHALED BEYDOUN*
Hosted by Nina Mozeihem** and Samuel Bagenstos***
The following is a transcription of an interview with Professor Khaled
Beydoun, conducted at the University of Michigan Law School on March
15, 2019. The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.
K. Beydoun: Thank you so much for having me. I really appreciate the Journal organizing this event.
To you students here today, obviously this event comes at a very
difficult time.
Today in New Zealand at two Christchurch mosques, there was
1
another Islamophobic massacre that took place. It was led by a
2
couple of perpetrators, specifically one who wrote a [seventy-four]
page manifesto pushing a clash of civilizations crusade against the
Muslim population in New Zealand and more broadly across the
world. Forty-nine people were killed, and many more people were
injured during Jumu’ah. Today is Jumu’ah, which is the holy day
for Muslims—the Sabbath, if you will.
Today’s event comes at a really poignant but timely moment to
discuss my book American Islamophobia: Understanding The Roots and
Rise of Fear, which looks to grapple with why events like this are taking place and looks to grapple with how the political moment, and
specifically political actors like our president, are in fact inciting
and emboldening these types of acts, not only in the United States
3
but across the world.
In the book, I define Islamophobia in a very specific way. I wrote
an article a couple of years back in the Columbia Law Review
4
which theorizes what Islamophobia is and what it encompasses.
*
Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law; Senior Affiliated Faculty,
University of California at Berkeley, Islamophobia Research & Documentation Project
(IRDP)
**
J.D. Candidate, December 2019, University of Michigan Law School
***
Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
1. Max Walden, New Zealand Mosque Attacks: Who Is Brenton Tarrant?, AL JAZEERA (Mar.
17, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-mosque-attacks-brentontarrant-190316093149803.html.
2. Professor Beydoun cited the length of the manifesto to be eighty-seven pages, but
reports seem to confirm the accurate length was seventy-four pages. See Jane Coaston, The
New Zealand Shooter’s Manifesto Shows How White Nationalist Rhetoric Spreads, VOX (Mar. 18,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/3/15/18267163/new-zealand-shootingchristchurch-white-nationalism-racism-language.
3. See generally KHALED A. BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: UNDERSTANDING THE
ROOTS AND RISE OF FEAR (2018).
4. Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamaphobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 108 (2016).
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The basic definition is that Islamophobia is the presumption that
expressions of Muslim identity are correlated with a propensity for
terrorism. I delineate Islamophobia into three forms: private Islamophobia, structural—state sponsored Islamophobia—and finally, and I think most importantly for today, dialectical Islamophobia, which is the process and the discourse whereby state action
and state rhetoric go on to authorize the kind of mass violence that
we see very vividly in places like New Zealand.
N. Mozeihem: What prompted you to write this book?
K. Beydoun: There were two main catalysts.
First, I have been a law professor for six years. I have spent much
of my tenure as a professor writing on the War on Terror. I have
been writing on how specific War on Terror policy has affected
Muslim Americans in the way they express their religious identity
and the way they go about exercising their religion—that kind of
dialectic between state policy but also responses from Muslim
communities.
And I realized as a law professor, that few people read law review
articles [laughter]—my work was not penetrating into the community and audiences that I wanted to reach. We spend a lot of
time trying to write articles and to get them placed in good journals, but our audience is very small and elite. I came to the realization that I wanted my work to be read by a broader audience, and
that intersected with the rise of Trump as a candidate. The specific
day on which I decided to write this book, and to write an accessible book, was December 7, 2015. That was the day that thencandidate Trump announced that it was his objective to put a stop
5
on the entry of Muslims.
The Muslim ban, as it came to be known, drove me to want to
write this book. Then I came back to Detroit, where I grew up, and
I realized what kind of effect that this brazen rhetoric from the
President was having on the community. This book, God willing,
inshallah, was able to speak to the experiences of Muslims on the
ground.
S. Bagenstos: I thought the book was terrific. It does a great job
of highlighting what Islamophobia is, what it isn’t, and the ways we
have to confront it. You do a great job of both identifying what Islamophobia is today, but also talking about the historical antecedents to and roots of it.

5. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for “Total and Complete” Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslimsentering-the-united-states/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52e1ae072780.
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Could you talk about how it has changed over time? Because it
was striking to me, when I read your book, that we think about this
manifestation of Islamophobia today as very much about terror
rhetoric, particularly post 9/11. But Islamophobia existed for a
very long time before 9/11.
K. Beydoun: For me, what was vital to illustrate in the book, but
also in my broader advocacy, is that Islamophobia is not a new
phenomenon. It was being framed as such with the rise of Trump
because of his explicit rhetoric and his brazen overtures. But being
a student of Edward Said and reading Orientalism, the way in which
Edward Said laid out Orientalism, is this master discourse that effectively goes about vilifying Islam, goes about vilifying the “Orient”
6
in mirror opposite term of the “West” or the “Occident.” It lays
the foundation and embeds the kind of stereotypes and tropes that
drive how we go about demonizing Islam and vilifying Muslims today.
There was an important article by a law scholar named Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, that was published in the imme7
diate wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. In the thesis of that article,
she argues that the 9/11 terror attacks led to the redeployment of
Orientalist tropes. That thesis brilliantly captures the flashpoint
when we see Orientalism evolving into the modern form of Islamophobia we have today.
Even though the political threats change over time—in the
eighties, the primary manifestation of Islamic threat was the Iranian government, with the rise of the Islamic Revolution of Khomeini—and even though the political face has changed, the stereotypes and tropes that drive the underlying fear are very much the
same and rooted in what Said theorizes as Orientalism.
N. Mozeihem: Can you flesh out more about the differences between private, structural, and dialectical Islamophobia?
K. Beydoun: It is important to think about Islamophobia in
these three forms.
The media tends to fixate, and the media will continue to fixate
with what happened today, on private Islamophobia. That is the
form that is inflicted by private actors: private citizens who inflict
or unleash mass violence because of specific ideas or individual
hate that they might have.
Second, we have structural Islamophobia. This is the more critical form and the form that is seldom discussed, both in the legal
literature but also in the broader public discourse. There has been
little framing of War on Terror policy after 9/11, but even more
6.
7.

See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
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recently, as a form of Islamophobia that we have to be concerned
with and reckon with, but also a form of Islamophobia that drives
private action.
When we think about structural Islamophobia, it is key to think
about structural reform of the counterterror state that happened
in the immediate wake of 9/11—the creation of The Department
8
of Homeland Security (DHS) and policies like the Patriot Act; policies like the National Security Entry Exit Registration System
9
(NSEERS), which was the Muslim registry before Trump announced that he wanted to enact a Muslim registry. So we have
structural Islamophobia being spearheaded by conservative governments, but we also have structural Islamophobia being advanced by Democratic administrations.
I write about how the radicalization in policing, surveillance
within Muslim communities, is the most nefarious form of struc10
tural Islamophobia. That was enacted and established under the
Obama administration (in 2011). Once we grapple with structural
Islamophobia as being something that can be conspicuous or latent, we understand that Islamophobia is not limited to right wing
conservative actors. In the same way we think about racism in the
Equal Protection context, we have facial discrimination which is
typically advanced by elements on the right; however, there is latent discrimination that has a disproportionate impact, which is oftentimes advanced by the left or center. It is key to think about Islamophobia in that way as well.
S. Bagenstos: How would you connect Islamophobia to other
kinds of structural bias or discrimination? We had this recent fight
in American politics about a resolution in Congress that condemns
anti-Semitism, and it becoming a broader resolution condemning
11
many things, including Islamophobia. Many people until this
morning, I think, were making fun of that politically, and now
maybe they see how important it was to broaden that resolution.
But I wonder in what ways are these biases all connected. There are
obviously threads we can we can draw between them, but there are
obviously differences as well.
K. Beydoun: There is an interesting dissonance between talking
about these different forms of animus in a genuine way, and
there’s a political conversation where they’re skewed because, to
8. Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now: Ways We Have Changed, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 14,
2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/911-to-now-ways-we-have-changed.
9. National
Security
Entry-Exit
Registration
System,
ARAB
AM.
INST.,
http://www.aaiusa.org/nseers (last visited May 10, 2019).
10. Khaled A. Beydoun, America, Islam, and Constitutionalism: Muslim American Poverty
and the Mounting Police State, 31 J. L. & RELIGION 279 (2016).
11. H.R. 183, 116th Cong. (2019).
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be frank, there’s greater weight given to different forms of animus,
especially within walls of power, like government.
But once we think about and connect Islamophobia and antiSemitism to anti-black racism and xenophobia and so on and have
a theoretical discussion specifically within the context of American
legal history, we see that there are not only bridges, but in fact, the
very crux or foundation that gives rise to these distinct forms of animus are one in the same.
An important starting off point is an act that was put in place a
couple of years after the enactment of the Constitution called the
12
Naturalization Act of 1790. This law stood in place until 1952. It
mandated whiteness as a prerequisite for citizenship. You had to be
white to become a naturalized citizen in the United States. Whiteness was not framed and construed in the way it is thought of today. Whiteness was framed really narrowly; initially speaking, it was
almost synonymous with Protestantism. As a consequence of that, a
whole host of individuals both of color but also religious minorities, were cast out of the legal definition of white. Jews, up until the
early twentieth century, were not thought of as bona fide whites.
Catholics were not thought of as bona fide whites. Italians, Slavs, a
whole host of people that we embrace as formal whites today, were
13
viewed to be beyond the scope of whiteness.
So we see in that sense how per se anti-Semitism, driven by very
narrow conceptions of American identity, formed how we thought
about citizenship. There’s this great book by law scholar Linda
Bosniak called The Citizen and the Alien, where she talks about strati14
fied citizenship drawn along racial and religious lines.
Today when we have the uptick in anti-Semitism, when we have
the uptick in Islamophobia, these are taking place and they’re not
rising within a political vacuum. They’re rising from a specific underbelly of the American legal imagination and history which
makes them easy to deploy very swiftly when we have a character
like Trump at the top who is unleashing the kind of rhetoric that
facilitates and maximizes that kind of rhetoric.
People in the advocacy space talk about white supremacy—
that’s kind of become a kitsch term, which for me is great because

12. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103, (repealed 1952) (“That any alien,
being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen
thereof, on application to any common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein
he shall have resided for the term of one year at least . . . .”).
13. Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American
Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013).
14. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP (2006).
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I’m a critical race theorist. But that’s in fact true. There is this vacillating conception of who is and who isn’t white, and individuals
who are advocates of white supremacy view whiteness as being synonymous with citizenship. They oftentimes don’t view Jews, immigrants, or individuals who adopt their specific ideology as being legitimate whites or legitimate citizens. This is very much the crux
that gives rise to these distinct forms of bigotry, Islamophobia, antiSemitism, xenophobia, and so forth and so on.
S. Bagenstos: One of the other interesting points from your
book that connects to that point is that there’s a degree to which
Islamophobia faces a lot of distinctions within Islam. And so you
have this very quick move from people who look at what Islam is
and they think it’s Arab. When in fact many Muslims in America
aren’t of Arab extraction, many are of South Asian extraction,
many are African-Americans whose families either came from West
India or came here as slaves. There’s also this increasing Latino
population as you talk about at the very beginning the book—in a
very interesting vignette. What can you say, as a critical race theorist, about connections across these different axes of identity?
K. Beydoun: Great question! This is something that I grapple
with in the book, but also something that I grapple with more
broadly. I think the most damning component of Islamophobia is
that it is driven by racialized caricature of who Muslims are. We
think about Muslims as being narrowly Arab or Middle Eastern,
brown, and immigrant. There’s a specific racial caricature that is
very much the foundation of Islamophobia, specifically private Islamophobia.
I think the state has become far more intelligent in understanding the racial, ethnic, even sectarian distinctions amongst the
broader Muslim American population. But within the private
mind—I don’t want to construct an archetypal Islamophobe—but
within the private Islamophobic mind, there is this idea that Muslims are exclusively Arab, immigrant and brown, which smacks
against statistics specifically within the Muslim American milieu.
Professor Bagenstos talked about how the biggest plurality of
Muslims today are in fact black, they’re African-American. If you
understand American history, that shouldn’t be surprising—fifteen
to thirty percent of enslaved Africans in this country came as Mus15
lims and continued to practice Islam while bonded to slavery. The
Nation of Islam:we have that history of black Muslim movements
15. Besheer Mohamed & Jeff Diamant, Black Muslims Account for a Fifth of All U.S. Muslims, and About Half Are Converts to Islam, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/black-muslims-account-for-a-fifth-ofall-u-s-muslims-and-about-half-are-converts-to-islam/.
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that preceded the entry of Muslim immigrants by at least five dec16
ades. Still today, if you look at conversion rates in the largest
growing segments of the Muslim American population, they are
17
Latino and white.
Muslim-America, ironically enough, is a microcosm for broader
American society. It’s the most diverse faith. It’s the most ethnically
18
racially heterogeneous. Arabs and Middle Eastern Muslims are in
fact the third biggest plurality. The stereotype clashes strongly with
the demographic steps.
N. Mozeihem: We’ve seen recently with Representative Ilhan
Omar, that a lot of people have been alleging Islamophobia and
19
the intense criticism to which she has been subjected. Do you
have any comments on that? How do you think Islamophobia has
played a role in the criticism both she and Representative Rashida
Tlaib have been receiving?
K. Beydoun: I know Ilhan, and I can tell you that Ilhan is a deeply spiritual person. She’s a pioneer in the sense that she’s the first
muhajabah—she’s the first Muslim American congresswoman to be
20
in that space and to wear the hijab.
There was a provision that Congress had that restricted individ21
uals from wearing hats. She had to overcome that initial hurdle. It
wasn’t a facially discriminatory provision; it was effectively one that
was related to decorum. But she occupies and she embodies this
challenging intersection in terms of what her identity is—she’s
black, she’s Somali, she’s a refugee, she’s a Muslima, she’s a conspicuous Muslima, she’s really progressive and unapologetic about
her progressive views. So she’s a threat to a disparate number of elements within not only Congress but within that power space in
16. Tynetta Muhammad, Brief history on origin of the Nation of Islam, NATION OF ISLAM
(Mar. 28, 1996), https://www.noi.org/noi-history/.
17. Tim Padgett, Why So Many Latinos Are Becoming Muslims, WLRN (Oct. 9, 2013),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/why-so-many-latinos-are-becoming-muslims.
18. Demographic Portrait of Muslim Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2017),
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/.
19. See Cody Nelson, Minnesota Congresswoman Ignites Debate On Israel And Anti-Semitism,
NPR
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/700901834/minnesotacongresswoman-ignites-debate-on-israel-and-anti-semitism; see also Michelle Goldberg, Ilhan
Omar’s Microaggression: Her Words Were Bad. The Reaction Was Worse., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/opinion/ilhan-omar-antisemitismdemocrats.html.
20. Andy Sullivan, Minnesota, Michigan Send First Muslim Women to U.S. Congress, REUTERS
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-islam-women/minnesotamichigan-send-first-muslim-women-to-u-s-congress-idUSKCN1NC095; see also Katherine Tully-McManus, After 181 Years of No Hats in Congress, Dems Eye Exception for Religious Garb, ROLL
CALL (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/hats-congress-religious-garbexception.
21. The Ban on Hats on the House Floor, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1800-1850/The-debate-over-the-rule-toban-hats-on-the-House-Floor/ (last visited May 10, 2019).
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Washington, D.C. because of who she is and because she’s made it
a point to speak unapologetically about her views.
Now, I’ll be frank, I think that the way she framed some of her
22
critiques of Israel were not the most intelligently framed. However, she’s a green Congresswoman who is new in that space. The reality is this: there is a small, narrow, or no margin of error at all because of who she is. Somebody else who has that same sort of
circumstance, being a green rookie congressperson, will be extended a lot in a margin of error. But because the microscope is
being positioned so tightly upon every step she makes—and that’s
23
true for Rashida as well, a congressperson from Detroit —by virtue
of who they are, they have little room for mistakes or missteps.
N. Mozeihem: In light of that, how would you interpret the rise
of Muslim candidates for office and in the United States, with both
Rashida and Ilhan being the first Muslim women in Congress, and
24
even here in Michigan we saw Abdul El-Sayed running for governor.
K. Beydoun: First of all, I love the fact that our most visible leadership, not only within government but in the civil rights spaces
and within academia, are Muslim women. In the book, I write
about how Muslim women are very much spearheading this new
Muslim American Renaissance or reawakening.
What I love about it is that it de-mystifies one of the core tropes
that are assigned on Muslim American identity, and specifically
Muslim American men, that we’re this patriarchal, aggressive, violent element that is keen on subordinating Muslim American
woman. But the trenchant, unapologetic, and resilient examples
being set forth by people like Rashida and Ilhan erode those stereotypes.
I think it’s a great thing! For me it’s empowering. I went to college here, and I can remember people looked at me crazy when I
told them that I wanted to go to law school. If you are Muslim
American, you’re either an engineer or a doctor, so [Nina and I]
disappointed our parents because we didn’t go on to become doctors. It was rare, and now that we see Muslim Americans rising and
running for office, it’s a beautiful thing. And I wouldn’t limit it

22. See BUSBOY & POETS, (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/
busboysandpoets/videos/353129905294312/. See also Karen Zraick, Ilhan Omar’s Latest Remarks on Israel Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/01/us/politics/ilhan-omar-israel.html.
23. CONGRESSWOMAN RASHIDA TLAIB, https://tlaib.house.gov/ (last visited May 10,
2019).
24. Stateside Staff, For Abdul El-Sayed, “The Path Hasn’t Changed” Despite Primary Loss,
MICH. RADIO (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/abdul-el-sayed-pathhasnt-changed-despite-primary-loss.
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specifically to Trump. I think that’s a sellable talking point in the
media space, that they’re running for office because of Trump, but
I think it shows a maturation or evolution within the community
that Muslim Americans are beginning to realize the importance of
running for office.
And I wish Abdul [El-Sayed] would have won. I wish Professor
Bagenstos would have won his race to be part of the Michigan Su25
preme Court. And I think they will win in the future, so hopefully
it’s not their only races.
Another thing worth noting is that one thing I’m struggling with
right now is this emergence of, what I call, extreme identity politics
on the left and right. It is important that we support candidates
who look and believe like us. But I think it’s more important for
candidates to stand up for principles, progressive principles, that
advance the interests of not only marginalized minorities but marginalized segments of people at large. I would vote for a nonMuslim candidate who is supportive of free exercise of religion and
inclusion over a conservative Muslim candidate. I just re-read this
article by Professor Nancy Leong called Racial Capitalism, which
warns against this fixation that is prevalent on the right, but also
present on the left, to only champion a person’s identity and supplanting the importance of identity with the importance of sub26
stance.
S. Bagenstos: I want to get back to another thing you were talking about, which is also an important point in the book, which is
that it’s not just Trump. We’re talking about a policy level of this,
part of structural Islamophobia. It is even Democratic administrations, like Barack Obama’s administration.
First, why is that? One way of thinking about Obama is that he
was elected, in part, as a reaction to what were perceived to be excesses of War on Terror rhetoric and policy in the Bush admin27
istration. And yet as you point out, he both reified some of the
stuff that was already there and created a bunch of new stuff that
raises problems. Second, how do we avoid that in the future?
K. Beydoun: I was a strong supporter of candidate Obama’s race
in 2008. Like most people, probably most people in this room, I
was inspired by him becoming the first black president. For me it
signaled, perhaps naively at that point, a shift in this country’s racial make-up toward the better. But then during his presidency, I
25. SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: JUSTICE FOR ALL, https://www.bagenstosforjustice.com/ (last
visited May 10, 2019).
26. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013); see also Nancy
Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1333 (2016).
27. See, e.g., Trevor McCrisken, Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and
Practice, 87 ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 781 (2011).
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began to realize that, regardless of the nature of the administration, that power is wed to perpetuating the War on Terror both
domestically and globally because it advances very coveted economic, political, and perhaps even epistemological interests for the
state.
I say that to highlight the point that Islamophobia is not only irrational. We tend to think about it, and it’s broadly framed as irrational action or hatred, but grappling with structural Islamophobia
reveals that it’s also rational. It’s used as a tool, whether it be law,
whether it be foreign policy, whether it be brokering relationships
with specific nation states that are the most damaging, like Saudi
Arabia for instance.
These are strategic expedients the state uses to carry forward
specific objectives. One of them in the region for instance, the reason we are keen on maintaining instability in the “Muslim world”
regardless of whether we have a Republican or Democratic administration, is because that instability advances our ability to access
oil. It advances our ability to keep tabs on nation states. It advances
our ability to further American foreign policy and influence in the
region. It’s rational in that sense.
In the Obama administration, even though President Obama
walks in—I’m half Egyptian, I was inspired when he walked into—
Al-Azhar, a University in Cairo and gave his beautiful speech
28
months after he was elected. The thesis of that speech effectively
was: it’s my job to mend the wounds of the War on Terror inflicted
by the Bush administration and broker a new peace between the
West and Islam. He was still kind of capitalizing on this Samuel
Huntington clash of civilizations type framing and rhetoric that
was problematic. Yet it signaled promise.
However, as the administration advanced and began to reveal itself, it became clear that that rhetoric was only a tool to advance
his specific form of War on Terror policy and the signature of his
administration was counter-radicalization policing. That’s why
President Obama did not walk into an American mosque until seven years into his administration. He was afraid that he was being
pegged a Muslim by the Right—that was one of the reasons why.
But second, he only found it fruitful and conducive to engage with
Muslims and Muslim Americans as a selling point for counter radicalization because counter radicalization is built upon this structure where the state needs to work with Muslims as informants, interlocutors, and stakeholders within the community to advance

28. C-SPAN, President Obama Speech to Muslim World in Cairo, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_889oBKkNU.
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surveillance. In the same way that COINTELPRO functioned in the
29
sixties; it’s the exact same model.
The rhetoric Obama used was beautiful, it was accepting, it was
tolerant, but it was characterized by dissidents in very destructive
policy.
S. Bagenstos: What would a good president on these issues look
like? What would a good administration on these issues look like?
K. Beydoun: The ideal would be dismantling and doing away
with the War on Terror. Statistically speaking, there has been no
bona fide threat from Muslim Americans. This whole concept of
homegrown radicalization, which the state peddles, is not based in
anything tangible. It’s all scare tactics. I analogize it to modern day
eugenics. There is this belief that there is something inherently violent about Muslim identity that drives these fears. The first step
would be dismantling and doing away with the War on Terror.
I’m a Bernie Sanders guy. I’m going to be a surrogate for his
campaign again this go around, because I believe in his foreign
policy— a less interventionist, more hands-off engagement with
the region. Most saliently, retrenching relationships with Saudi
Arabia. If you want to hone in on one nation state that is the greatest abettor and aider of terrorism, it would be them. Their form of
Islamic interpretation, Wahhabism, is what drives the ideology of
ISIS, al Qaida, Al Shababb in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, so
30
on and so forth. You can track how petrol dollars have given rise
to the growth of these frightening terror networks across the
world. However, they are our primary ally in the region, especially
this new, whacko Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) who fashions
31
himself as a Saudi Arabian Trump.
That’s what I would do—retrench the War on Terror enterprise
and rethink our foreign policy, specifically our relationships with
countries like Saudi Arabia.

29. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COINTELPRO, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro
(last visited May 10, 2019) (compiling the surveillance activities of COINTELPRO over a
fifteen year period which included monitoring of members of the civil rights movement); see
also Betty Medsger, Just Being Black Was Enough to Get Yourself Spied on by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI,
NATION (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/just-being-black-was-enoughget-yourself-spied-j-edgar-hoovers-fbi/.
30. See
OXFORD
ISLAMIC
STUD.
ONLINE,
Wahhabis,
http://www.oxford
islamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2467 (last visited May 10, 2019) (providing a quick
summary and history of the Wahhabism); see also Christopher M. Blanchard, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, CONG. REP. SERV., https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS21695.pdf (last updated Jan. 24, 2008) (providing a more in-depth summary of the history of Wahhabism and present-day issues).
31. Frank Gardner, Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince MBS Takes Charm Offensive East, BBC
NEWS (Feb 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47361745 (describing
MBS’ recent actions in and outside Saudi Arabia).
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They’re probably not going to let me in when I try to do the pilgrimage in a couple of years. If they read my Twitter, they definite32
ly won’t let me in.
N. Mozeihem: In terms of dismantling Islamophobia, more on
the private sphere, do you think that starts with talking about structural Islamophobia and dealing with that before you can transition
to societal conceptions that lead to private Islamophobia?
K. Beydoun: That’s a hard question. I speak to so many different
audiences about this, and I sometimes struggle with what to lead
with.
It’s easy with you guys because you guys are lawyers and future
lawyers, so we can understand how the law functions. But I just
spoke at Oregon State University with a largely undergraduate audience, and you have to reel them in with the private Islamophobia
because that’s what they know. They consume what they know
through mainstream but also social media. It’s easier for non-legal
audiences to work with a visual embodiment of who Islamophobes
are. Trump makes perfect sense because of his brazen rhetoric; individual actors like these terrorists in New Zealand are good starting off point. Then you segue into the law. But because of the education in the room today, I would flip the script and lead with
structural Islamophobia and lead with the law.
N. Mozeihem: Speaking of the terrorist attack in New Zealand,
how much do you think right wing hate speech—that manifests itself in clear Islamophobia, according to your book—how much do
you think that plays a role in manifesting in violence against Muslims?
K. Beydoun: It’s clear. The Australian terrorists who committed
those acts at the Christchurch mosque made it manifestly clear. He
wrote this [seventy-four] page manifesto, he called Trump, he said
that Trump inspired him, that he was reawakening a kind of new
white identity, he talked about how it was his objective to bring
about a civil war, a crusade against Muslims in New Zealand.
[Seventy-four] pages.
When these guys are writing manifestos, whether it be Islam33
ophobia or anti-black racists like Dylan Roof, they’ve spent a lot
of time thinking about this stuff and writing about this stuff. These
are premeditated actions. I think it’s critical for us to understand
that.

32. See generally Khaled Beydoun (@KhaledBeydoun), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
KhaledBeydoun?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor.
33. Alan Binder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof Is Sentenced to Death in Charleston Church Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/dylann-rooftrial-charleston.html.

SUMMER 2019]

Interview with Khaled Beydoun

915

Why I talk about Islamophobia as a dialectic—that the words
from people like Trump isn’t only political rhetoric, it is strategically used to mobilize voters. That might be the most imminent
short-term objective, but it also has to be viewed as a call to action.
It is irresponsible for a politician to not think that there are hateful
elements on the ground who are going to interpret that language
as an authorization to inflict vigilante violence against elements of
the community that the President has cast as being subhuman, inferior, or inherently violent.
These acts, to be frank with you, are not surprising me. I’m
numb to them now because they happen so often. We live in a political landscape where bigots like Trump are being lauded and
championed by these culprits as an inspiration, and the unfortunate reality is that just as long as we have elements like him in high
office, it’s going to continue.
Q&A WITH STUDENT AUDIENCE
Student Question: You mentioned Saudi Arabia being the wrong
key ally in the region. How else would you envision an ideal foreign policy for the United States in that region?
K. Beydoun: This is the clash: how do we reconcile countries
that have great economic stake with us with the interest in not
aligning ourselves fully with nations that have been exporting
harmful ideology. Not only harmful ideology, but a country that is
perhaps antithetical to American values in terms of how they go
about treating their own citizenry. There’s no tolerance for religious minorities, there’s clearly no emphasis on women’s rights—
women can’t drive in that country—there’s no tolerance for dissidents, academic freedom, so on and so forth. So apart from Saudi
Arabia being keen on exporting Wahabi Islam to its petrol dollars,
it’s also a very undemocratic and tyrannical country.
I’m not naïve. I know that nation states like the United States
are rational actors where economic interests mean a great deal and
the nature of the administration can have a great deal of impact on
how we go about negotiating our relationship with countries like
Saudi Arabia. I am very critical of President Obama; however, I
think that President Obama would navigate his relationship dramatically differently than President Trump. Because of MBS, being
such a violent brazen, autocrat, I think Obama would have rethought the nature of the relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Moving forward, we have to realize and affectively do an accounting of what is the economic net gain justifying the political
loss accrued by having this relationship with Saudi Arabia. If this
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government is truly genuine about its global War on Terror and
retrenching it, then the most immediate solution is to rethink the
relationship with countries like Saudi Arabia. However, that’s why I
think that there is no genuine interest on the part of brass within
the State Department or the executive to retrench the War on Terror. I think that there are rational benefits that are gained through
perpetuating this global idea that Muslims are menacing and willing to destroy the United States, even though statistics don’t prove
that. If you look at ISIS for instance, ninety-nine percent of ISIS
34
victims are Muslims. ISIS has not posed itself to be a real threat to
the United States.
I wrote a series of articles on counter radicalization policing, this
programming that is established in places like Minneapolis, Los
35
Angeles, Boston, but also informally in places like Detroit. The
cases where they’ve identified homegrown radicals have either
been fabricated or trumped up, embellished investigations.
I’m not sure if [the administration is] being genuine, but I guess
and think that they’re not. Foreign policy is deeply connected with
the way we go about steering our domestic anti-terror program.
Student Question: Do you find that there is a unique American
strand of Islamophobia? Or because of the internet and social media, has Islamophobia been exported globally?
K. Beydoun: There definitely is a uniquely American strand that
is distinct from the way Islamophobia is unfolding in places like
France, China, and India, because of the way we think about who
Muslims are.
If you go to France, for instance, I would venture to say that Islamophobia is comparatively more intense than it is in the United
States because of the geographic proximity of Muslim majority
countries but also the recent colonial history that France has in
places like Algeria, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, and so on
and so forth. But in France, the caricaturing of Muslim identity is
broader in nature. There isn’t this idea that Muslims are only Arabs or Middle Easterners. Black Muslims who come from countries
like Chad and Cameroon also pose the same kind of Islamophobia
threat in a country like France that an Algerian or a Moroccan
Muslim might in that country. It’s framed more along religious
terms, where in the United States it’s a bit more racialized.
34. Anthony Cordesman, Islam and the Patterns in Terrorism and Violent Extremism, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/islam-and-patternsterrorism-and-violent-extremism (“Almost all of the human impact of extremist attacks is
Muslims killing or injuring fellow Muslims.”).
35. See, e.g., Khaled Beydoun, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and Double Standards, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 117 (2018); Khaled Beydoun Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor
and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1463 (2016).
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American Islamophobia is driven more by racial identity. We can
see that through the victimization of Sikh men. It’s oftentimes Sikh
men, because of their religious presentation, that are the primary
victims of private Islamophobic violence. That was true after 9/11
We had a string of attacks against Sikh men and the broader community because it’s driven in the United States by more of a racial
36
imagining of who Muslims are.
In places like France, more religious, India, very religious, so it’s
Hindus who look exactly like Indian Muslims might look and driven again by religion.
In places like China, it’s more complex. You might have heard
of what’s happening in China with the internment of the Uighur
37
Muslims; it’s driven by religion. That’s a country where atheism is
enshrined. But also it’s political in the sense that Uighur Muslims
want their own nation state and the status capitalizing on, ironically enough, the adoption of American War on Terror terminology
to cast Uighur Muslims as presumptive terrorists to religiously persecute them but also deflate the possibility of them having their
own nation state.
Islamophobia looks differently and unfolds differently in line
with the characteristics of its host state. Which is why I wrote a
book on American Islamophobia, because it would sound really disjointed if it was Islamophobia more broadly.
Student Question: What are some of the difficulties with discrimination against Islam, given that Islam is not only an identity that
people carry, but also something you believe in and carries a set of
beliefs as well. And the rhetoric bounces around from statements
that are clearly facially racist to some that address belief and practice. This takes us from discussing xenophobia to ideology, a debate about racism to a debate about what my group believes versus
what your group believes.
Can you talk about that dynamic and what makes Islamophobia
unique in that sense?
K. Beydoun: Islamophobia is unique in the sense that it does
blur the lines between race and religion.

36. Fact Sheet on Post-9/11 Discrimination and Violence against Sikh Americans, SIKH
COALITION,
https://www.sikhcoalition.org/images/documents/fact%20sheet%20on%20hate%20agains
t%20sikhs%20in%20america%20post%209-11%201.pdf (last visited May 10, 2019).
37. Chris Buckley & Amy Qin, Muslim Detention Camps Are Like ‘Boarding Schools,’ Chinese
Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/world/
asia/china-xinjiang.html.
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I just wrote this article, Faith in Whiteness, which challenges the
idea that race and religion are distinct ideas or distinct identities. 38
In this country’s history religion has always been racialized, whether it be Islam, Catholicism, Judaism, and so on and so forth. And
we see how that blurring of race and religion takes place within the
broader popular discourse.
You’re right, I think that this is a conversation that’s happening
specifically within the Muslim American community, so I don’t
want to let our bad laundry out. But I will say that there is this tension between this emergence of assuming a political Muslim identity as a consequence of 9/11 and the rise of Trump, with Islam being framed specifically as a belief system. However, that internal
conversation, if you map it with what’s happening more broadly
speaking, can be messy and the Fox News host you mentioned
doesn’t necessarily see a distinction because her understanding
and framing of Islam is not necessarily as a religion, not necessarily
as a race, but as a rival civilization. The Right views Islam oftentimes not as a bona fide religion but as a political ideology, a political movement, and a rival civilization.
So when you listen to Fox News—younger folks, if you listen to
Ben Shapiro on the right or you listen to Bill Maher on the left—
they seldom talk about Islam as being a bona fide religion that is
worthy of free exercise protection. They view it as a political menace that doesn’t deserve free exercise protection because by way of
manifesting itself—whether it be through the hijab, Muslims collectively congregating on days like today to go pray, Muslims running for office like Abdul El-Syed—their objective is to promote
Sharia law and to erode and undermine the democratic values and
virtues of this country.
The blurring of race and religion that takes place within the
popular space is, whether consciously or subconsciously, driven by
the idea that most critics don’t view Islam as a bona fide religion or
religion worth protecting because it’s so tightly tied to the specter
of imminent violence and threat. Again, this is a rhetoric not only
coming from the right. It’s coming from elements on the left as
well.
N. Mozeihem: I remember watching Bill Maher saying that Is39
lamophobia is not a thing, that it doesn’t exist.

38. Khaled Beydoun, Faith in Whiteness: Free Exercise of Religion as Radical Expression, 105
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
39. Raya Jalabi, A History of the Bill Maher’s ‘Not Bigoted’ Remarks on Islam, GUARDIAN (Oct.
7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2014/oct/06/billmaher-islam-ben-affleck (reviewing Bill Maher’s history of anti-Muslim comments).
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K. Beydoun: His bookers of the show wanted to invite me a couple of years back, and I struggled with whether to do it or not. I was
a big fan of Bill Maher, and I agree with ninety percent of what he
says. But it’s only when he talks about Muslims and Islam that I feel
I’m not sure I can watch the show anymore.
Student Question: Since the Supreme Court’s decision last
40
summer, a lot of the discussion about the Muslim Ban has slowed
to a trickle. It there any hope of changing that other than getting a
new president?
K. Beydoun: It has to be a new president because it’s an executive order. But the reality is that the composition of the Supreme
Court might not change significantly, unless something dramatic
happens and a Democratic president takes over.
The majority decision that Justice Roberts wrote was driven by a
41
textualist reading of the third version of the order. It denied the
importance of Trump’s rhetoric and also denied the language of
the first and second versions of the Muslim Ban. In my opinion,
the first version was facially discriminatory. By naming seven Muslim majority countries and creating exceptions for religious minorities, you can do the math then understand that it was specifically
talking about Muslims.
That’s why I was a strong advocate of Professor Bagenstos’s campaign. If in the imminent future we have Republicans dominating
the executive and Supreme Court, then our only hope comes within the state courts. So hopefully Trump is defeated by Sanders—
sorry, if there are supporters of other candidates in the room.
There are many Democrats running for office now, and Beto just
42
announced! But if Trump continues on with a second term, then
things look bleak.
S. Bagenstos: Let me just say one thing about that and slightly
hijack the point a little bit –
K. Beydoun: No pun intended.
[Laughter]
S. Bagenstos: I was worried about that. Fair enough.
For an audience of law students, it’s important, and it’s such a
great point the last question raised. There was all this activism and
energy around the Muslim ban, and then it all got channeled into
a legal rhetoric in a legal strategy.
40.
41.
42.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
ROLLING STONE STAFF, The RS Politics of 2020 Democratic Primary Leaderboard,
ROLLINGSTONE (May 8, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/
2020-democrat-candidates-771735/; Politico Staff, Do you know the 2020 Democratic presidential
candidates?,
POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2019/2020-democraticpresidential-candidates-list/ (last updated Apr. 22, 2019).
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We all started just listening to the folks who said, “this is unconstitutional, and the courts are going to say so.” “John Roberts really
wants to say that Korematsu was wrong and so does Anthony Kennedy.” And it turns out that they were able to sign an opinion that
said Korematsu is wrong, while upholding our modern-day Korematsu. Honestly, Justice Black who wrote Korematsu could have said
exactly the same thing [as the Roberts opinion] in the Korematsu
opinion.
Once everything got channeled into the courts and got channeled into a legal strategy, much of the political energy around it
dissipated. I think that’s a problem, and something as future lawyers who care about issues of social justice, you want to think about:
How do you use your legal skills and talents and the monopoly you
have on going into court, which can be very useful, as a way of assisting a social justice movement without dissipating a social justice
movement, without taking away the energy of the movement?
It’s a great question precisely because the Muslim ban gives you
a great example of legalization ending up kind of suppressing the
movement.
Student Question: Given their failure to consider the history of
the ban itself or Trump’s own rhetoric and the Court putting on
blinders to the context, do you think there is still any use in legal
remedies against this structural bias? Or at this point are we only
really looking at solutions in the electorate?
K. Beydoun: I think now what’s going to happen in the interim
is we are seeing a revitalization of anti-Sharia bans that are taking
place and being peddled by politicians who are very much inspired
by a clash of civilizations worldview and definitely emboldened by
the moment.
Because we’re dealing with a majority conservative Supreme
Court, these laws have to be explicitly discriminatory on their face
in order for a legal remedy by the court to be exacted against this
legislation. Legislators oftentimes are smart, oftentimes are not,
but on the second go around, they went about crafting the legislation in facially neutral terms which makes it very conducive for majority conservative courts, whether it be circuit courts or the Supreme Court, to go about upholding these laws.
I want to be optimistic. But I also want to not lie to you. Unless
something dramatic happens on the national level, we’re going to
see an entrenchment of what took place with the Trump v. Hawaii
case on the federal level.
Student Question: Movements against Islamophobia and AntiSemitism have a lot of the same qualities, but they are also in tension with one another—especially where missteps and words can
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undermine cooperation. On an organizational level, how can
groups like the Anti-Defamation League and Council on AmericanIslamic Relations harness political energy and address these issues
together at a time when it is very important to do so?
K. Beydoun: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are deeply connected. They are forms of animus that have long entrenched histories in this country. There is strategic importance for Jewish leadership and Muslim leadership to fight against these forms of animus.
What happened in New Zealand today looks just like what hap43
pened in Pittsburgh a couple of months back. It was carried out
by the same kind of element.
The reality is one where there is a dividing point that is a foreign
policy issue, which is the state of Israel and how to go about framing and resolving that issue. That is the primary stumbling block
that is stifling, if not entirely undermining, these communities
from working with one another.
I’m not a foreign policy guy, but I’m going to try to step out of
my lane for a bit and give you an answer on that issue. To me, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a religious issue. Its framing as a
religious issue by Jews and Muslims alike does a disservice to bringing about a resolution. It is akin to what took place in South Africa,
it is akin to what takes place in countries where there is a cognizable persecuted and subordinated people.
For Palestine, religion is used as a vehicle. It’s used as an instrument by both sides to promote their own interests, whether it be
Muslim countries using the Palestinian issue to mobilize their own
following and interest in that country, or Israeli and Zionist elements domestically. To frame it as a religious issue, because the objective is political and it is the real objective, is not resolving that
issue. We can see that issue bleeding into how Jewish American
and Muslim American leadership interact, or don’t interact,
around matters on which they have to build coalitions. Again, antiSemitism and Islamophobia, if not closely and intimately tied, are
one in the same.

43. Campbell Robertson, et al., 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged With 29
Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/activeshooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html.

